WHAT IS ISRAEL'S VULNERABILITY UNDER THE IRAN DEAL?

It is sad that our political discourse appears to have been reduced to the use of techniques ad agencies routinely employ. All along the political spectrum we tend to create a 'broken record" effect. Apparently the more we hear the same thing over and over again, the more we believe that what we hear is true. Psychologists refer to this technique as the creation of "the illusion of truth." People are more likely to believe familliar statements than unfamilliar ones. Hence the incessant repetition.

Nowhere does this seem to be employed more that during the current debate about the deal with Iran, especially as it applies to the relative vulnerability of the state of Israel. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu started the mantra by asserting that "the accord is a historic mistake," and that the final deal based on this agreement "would threaten the survival of Israel."

Since this is the beginning of our election cycle, many of our president wannabe's quickly joined the chorus. Senator Lindsey Graham, in a  committee hearing, stated that "Iran's Supreme Leader's religious views compel him over time to destroy Israel and destroy America." Former Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee went as far as suggesting that the deal has the effect of "marching the Israelis to the door of the oven." Skeptics might inject that some of the most prolific financiers of the republican candidates, like Sheldon Adelson, are among the staunchest supporters of Israel and Mr. Netanyahu. Critique of the latter's assertions could hamper fundraisiing efforts. 

Having said all this, it appears legitimate to actually review the veracity of the statements that predict Israel's survival is at stake once this deal goes into effect. We should determine  Israel's military vulnerability as well as Iran's existential threat to Israel's security. In addition we need to consider the political elements of the conversation.

David Roberts, deputy director at the Royal United Services Institute, believes that Israel's military is the best equipped and best trained in the entire region. Israel's airforce has been called the best in the world. Iran has a population ten times larger than Isrrael's from which to draw its armed forces, but much of its military hardware is of dubious condition. Israel's defense budget is 47% greater than Iran's. Conventionally Iran possesses more mortars, anti-tank weapons, anti-aircraft weapons and troops on the ground. However, given the geographical distance between the two countries - close to 1,200 miles -any direct confrontration between Israel and Iran would likely involve long-distance aircraft, air defense weaponry, small naval craft and ballistic missiles. Both countries have missile delivery systems capable of reaching each other. Israel also possesses five German made Dolphin-class submartines capable of launching cruise missiles with nuclear warheads.

Here is the rub. While Iran may have pursued the creation of nuclear weapons, Israel launched its nuclear program in the 1960's, led by by Shimon Peres in his capacity as a director-general  in the Ministry of Defense. The country has never admitted to having WMDs, and established a policy of "nuclear ambiguity." This policy was shaped between Israeli and American leaders, serving both sides' interest of establishing Israeli military dominance while making it appear as if international norms were not compromised. In 1980 significant information about this program was leaked by a nuclear technician turned whistle blower, Mordechai Vanunu. Over the years bits and pieces of information have come out. It is now largely assumed that Israel has somewhere between  80 and 200 nuclear warheads  in its arsenal. It is the only nuclear power in the Middle East.

Given what appears to be Israel's overwhelming military dominance in the region, one could reasonably suggest that Israel possesses multiple ways of defending itself against Iran. Much has been made of potential preemptive strikes. While Israel certainly has the equipment to pursue these, distance and a complicated trajectory would get in the way. Besides, even though several Sunni states in the region might support the idea in principle, they would most likely object to it for practical and political reasons. Israel could probably not eradicate all suspected nuclear sites in Iran, and it would incite significant pushback in the region.. Besides, even a nearly-nuclear state of Iran would still possess large conventional and chemical rocket forces. Many other thrteatening missiles would remain under the control of its sub-state terrorist proxies. Hezbollah, the well armed Shiite militia, already has more rockets in its arsenal than do all NATO countries combined. It is even less likely than Iran's own leaders to hold back on any preemption retalliations.

According to Purdue professor Louis Beres and retired U.S. Navy admiral Leon Edney "Israel's best security plan, going forward, would be to enhance its underlying nuclear deterrence posture, and to render this ccritical enhancement as conspicuous as possible. This means that Jerusalem should do everything possible to signal any future Iranian aggressor that its own nuclear forces are plainly survivab le, and capable of penetrating any of Tehran's ballistic missile or other active defenses." It would also become necessary for Israel to move beyond its traditional posture of deliberate nuclear ambiguity. In other words, let the world know what you have, and that you are able and willing to use it if need be.

This is obviously not a military decision, it is a political calculation. Israel is extremely well positioned to defend itsel against anything Iran can throw at it. However, it does need to let its adversaries know the extent of its capability. Mr. Netanyahu's calculation appears to be political in intent. He highlights perceived existential threats, and  directs the focus away from domestic problems. However, not everyone in Israel's leadership agrees with that determination.  "I am not underestimating the significance of a njuclear Iran, but we should not give it Holocaust subtext  like politicians try to do," said former Israel Defense Force Chief of Staff Dan Halutz, who commanded the Israeli military during the war in Lebanon in 2006. Former Prime Minister Ehud Barak said in a widely circulated  September 2009 interview that he did not believe that Iran was an existential threat to Israel.

Mr. Netanyahu is known to do what is politically expedient, not always what is rational. It is questionable whether he would be inclined to pursue a defense policy focused on "deterrence," given what would have to happen. A prerequisite of such a policy would presumably be giving up "nuclear ambiguity," and letting adversaries in the region know that Israel  has the capacit to harm any inclined to attack it. Deterrence also presumes that the actors in the conflict act rationally, and are not determined to commit suicide. It worked well during the cold war. It should work again if executed correctly. It beats the alternative.

During previous election cycles Mr. Netanyahu managed to magically "develop" lethal skirmishes with Hamas and Gaza. These "events" did not happen coincidentally, they were designed for domestic consumption. They worked. He was re-elected. Right now his governing coalition is in trouble. Who knows what he will do. I believe he should do what is best for Israel, and position itself defensively. Its vulnerability is not military, it is political.