WHY DO WE FAIL TO EXPORT DEMOCRACY?

In 1917, President Woodrow Wilson declared that the United States had to enter World War I to "make the world safe for democracy." Ever since, our foreign policy has included efforts to encourage democratic developments in foreign countries. In 2004, President George W. Bush announced that "it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture." And, more recently, President Joe Biden told world leaders at the Munich Security Conference that "we must demonstrate that democracy can still deliver for our people in this changed world." It is not much of a stretch to claim that ever since the Cold War our foreign policy establishment has used "democracy" as an export commodity, convinced that it is a substitute for violence, and, hence, a desirable objective to pursue. We favor democratic regime types because stable democracies tend to have better long-term economic growth records, and do much better in terms of protecting basic human rights. Democracies are less likely to kill vast numbers of their own citizens through famine or ill-planned acts of social engineering, because corrective information is more readily accessible, and officials can be held accountable. And even though democracies are just as likely to start wars as any other state, there is some (contested) evidence that they tend to not fight each other. On balance, many politicians believe that it would be better for most human beings if the number of democracies in the world increased. Lofty language and repetitively articulated political objectives aside, our efforts at transitioning undemocratic governments, including during our 20 year endeavor in Afghanistan, have largely failed. Political scientist Abraham Lowenthal, professor of international relations at U.S.C, stated the obvious when he concluded that "U.S. attempts to export democracy have been [unsuccessful], often counterproductive, and only occasionally positive." If we are convinced that pursuing such a policy objective should be dominant and desirable, we ought to question why we have such a poor success rate accomplishing it. The answers percolating to the surface include that these goals are largely naive, ignoring essential preconditions in target countries, and that our execution appears ill considered and even duplicitous. Critics have long recognized our ineffectiveness, lack of consistency, and a one-size-fits-all approach, while suspecting that we callously use "democracy" as justification for military intervention abroad. Over and over again we discovered that military involvement does not foster enduring regime change. The idea that the U.S. could march in, depose a despot-in-chief and his henchmen, write a new constitution, hold a few elections, and produce a stable democracy was always delusional. However, a lot of smart people bought the idea despite overwhelming evidence against it. If we are unwilling to believe that all of these are hopelessly naive, we must assume that much of the rhetoric is designed for domestic consumption. Otherwise, why would policy makers continue to attempt the same, mostly military, pursuits with a history of predictable negative outcomes, somehow expecting a different result every time? Policy wonks need to recognize that there is no quick, cheap or reliable way for outsiders to engineer a democratic transition, especially when the country in question has little or no prior experience with it and contains deep social divisions. A successful liberal democracy depends on a lot more than a written constitution and elections. To have any chance for success in another country, the prospective state needs to possess effective legal systems, have an established, broad commitment to pluralism - a system in which multiple sources of authority coexist, a decent level of income and education, and widespread confidence that political groups that lose out in a particular election have a decent chance of doing better in the future, and thus have an incentive to keep working within the system. Creating reasonably effective democracies took centuries in the West, and it was often a highly contentious, even violent process. Using force to spread democracy almost always triggers violent resistance from groups that have lost power, wealth or status in the course of democratic transition. Violence tends to empower leaders who are good at stopping the transition instead of those skilled at building institutions or promoting democratic values. Three decades after the end of the Cold War it is no longer clear that American style democracy has carried the day. Multiple studies suggest that many countries still want democracy, but not necessarily the American version. Research completed by the Eurasia Group Foundation, based on a survey of citizens in eight countries, concluded that we would be more successful if we promoted democracy around the world without the explicit American package, often delivered by our military. We should accept that each country will need to find its own path to adopt democracy. "Attraction" will prove more effective than "promotion" as a way to help the concept expand. In other words, we should lead by example. Former president Jimmy Carter put it succinctly: "The best way to enhance freedom in other lands is to demonstrate here that our democratic system is worthy of emulation." Our democratic ideals are more likely emulated by others if we are widely regarded as just, prosperous, vibrant and tolerant, instead of displaying rampant inequality, the world's largest prison population, a decaying infrastructure, millions of qualified citizens excluded from voting and exhibiting one of the greatest income inequality in the developed world. Theo Wierdsma