DOOMSDAY LOOMS FOR AFGHAN ALLIES

In April, President Biden announced that, after being engaged there for twenty years, the U.S. would withdraw all its troops from Afghanistan by September 11 of this year. When we initiated this war on October 7, 2001, our objectives were to dismantle al qaeda, remove the Taliban from power and remake the country into a democracy. While we had some successes early on, we ultimately ended up frustrated. As the British found out almost 200 years ago, and the Soviet Union more recently, the political, cultural and geographic complexity of Afghanistan is such that foreign powers have an insurmountable task of putting their own stamp on the country. During the process of trying, we spent $2.26 trillion, lost 2,312 lives, while the local Afghan population suffered in excess of 6,400 casualties. Following our departure, Afghanistan anticipates only a limited number of possible outcomes: a takeover of the country by the Taliban, which has grown in strength and gained control over progressively more territory ever since the announcement was made; a defeat of the Taliban by the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces, which is having an increasingly more difficult job without the support of U.S. air power; or a resurgent civil war. On the U.S. side, President Biden's announcement was largely met with relief. Pursuit of our mission had rapidly become indefensible, and the feeling that it was time to bring the troops home already prevailed. But what is relief for some, converts to anxiety among the 50,000 plus Afghans who served with our military units during the past twenty years. Of these, 18,000 and up to 53,000 family members are nervously attempting to obtain the necessary visas to leave the country for the U.S.. Most fear assassination by Taliban militia who view them as traitors. There have already been at least 300 targeted killings of people who worked with us. If we don't get our act together and get them out, many more could end up being slaughtered. The timetable for withdrawal already accelerated. At the current rate we could complete our exit as soon as some time in July. Regardless, even if we run the operation out until the September 11 completion target, there are at most three months left. Not enough time for our State Department to process the admitted backlog of 18,000 Special Immigrant Visa applications. By law, these applications need to be approved or denied within nine months. However, they have instead taken three to five years to get resolved. A significant problem has been that many applicants lack appropriate documentation of their work background. Afghans who worked with the CIA or other spy agencies face especially difficult hurdles, since they often have no tangible proof of who they worked with. Many operatives never used their real names. Besides, a significant number of applicants can't produce the money for required medical screenings. In the mean time, the embassy staff in Kabul has already been decimated. It faced increased violence and threats as troops began leaving the country. Thus far it only managed to process about 20% of visa requests. Officials insist that the embassy will continue to process the S.I.V. program even after all U.S. troops have left the country. But continued security threats could well hamper that effort. The Taliban issued a statement of its own, urging Afghans to remain in the country: "The Islamic Emirate would like to inform all the above people that they should show remorse for their past actions and must not engage in such activities in the future that amount to treason against Islam and the country. But none should currently desert the country. The Islamic Emirate will not perturb them, but calls them to return to their normal lives, and if they have expertise in any field, to serve the country. They shall not be in any danger on our part." As might be expected, few in or out of Afghanistan trust the veracity of this declaration. With time running out and the logistics of successfully managing the overwhelming visa backlog unrealistically remote, the potential of a calamitous outcome is becoming more apparent. While pulling out our troops well ahead of schedule may garner some political points at home, if part of our objective is, as it should be, to protect our Afghan allies, this expedited withdrawal ought to be discouraged. Time will be of the essence. We will need all the time we can muster to get the job done. And given the virtual impossibility of completing the visa application process, we should instead focus on getting our interpreters and other co-workers out of the country before we leave. Visas can be processed elsewhere. We need to begin to evacuate those in danger. We can do this. We have done this before. Toward the end of the Vietnam war, during "Operation New Life," we evacuated 111,000 Vietnamese to Guam. Preceding the capture of Saigon by the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN), "Operation Frequent Wind" evacuated almost all of the American civilian and military personnel, along with thousands of Vietnamese civilians. And when Saddam Hussein's regime attacked Iraq's Kurdish region, the U.S. military evacuated about 6,600 Iraqi Kurds to Guam as well. The process is not new. It just takes political will to set it in motion. A growing number of decision makers have apparently already reached the conclusion that evacuation is the moral and only rational choice. Processing visa applications can certainly be accomplished in a third country or U.S. territory. The State Department and the Department of Defense are reportedly drawing up plans to do just that. There is little time left, and the logistics of such an undertaking in a country experiencing rapidly advancing Taliban control would still be challenging. However, if we fail to protect and extricate our Afghan allies, we are effectively sentencing them and their families to a very uncertain future, including death. That outcome would have a lasting impact on our future partnerships and global reputation. Theo Wierdsma